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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
2LARATION OF RIGHTS AS A PROP 
FREE AND NATURAL PERSON 
claiming his rights to less stringent standards than those actions in formal appeals by 
lawyers or attorneys. Since many of the issues irgumer uenueu 
portions of the arguments on one issue be used as additional support for one or more 
arguments on other issues. the CA will accept i jpellant's 
arguments even though they are "broader than the questions". 
Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 27.) 
In Propria Persona 
1 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a judgement of Case No. 87-200-5384 in the Layton Circuit 
Court, Layton, Utah, for violation of U.C.A. 41-6-46 (1953). 
The trial was held on April 22, 1988, with Judge K. Roger Bean, presiding. The 
sentencing hearing was held on April 26, 1988. 
A second trial, and a part of this appeal, was held on May 13, 1988 pertaining to 
a Contempt of Court charge made against the Defendant/Appellant during the Precinct 
Court trial on this matter. Judge Bean again presided. Judge John Stewart was the 
complaining judge. Defendant/Appellant was found guilty and here appeals that finding 
and that proceeding. 
The Notice and Demand for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal and the Notice of 
Appeal on the first trial were filed on April 26, 1988. 
The Notice of Appeal on the Contempt of Court charge was filed on June 1,1988. 
The case concerns a speeding citation for traveling 65 mph in a posted 55 mph 
zone. This was a second citation given to the Defendant by the same officer some 30 
days after the Precinct Court trial on the first case. 
In this case, as in the first case, the officer avoided the questions in cross-
examination that would have put the facts before the court. Instead, the officer answered 
with prejudicial and accusatory remarks against the Defendant. The officer made written 
prejudicial, false, immaterial and irrelevant statements on the back of the citation. 
The Appellant Citizen claims his right to travel unmolested has been violated. That 
there was no crime, damage, loss, injury, trespass, intent or threat to harm any person 
or property. 
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The Appellant made only "Dilatory" pleas before the courts and appeared specially 
and not generally on all occasions, demanded his rights at all times and not waiving any 
of his rights at any time, including his right to time. The purpose of the dilatory pleas was 
not to delay, but to deny jurisdiction to the court in this instant matter. To plea otherwise 
would have been construed as accepting the lower court's jurisdiction. 
The Appellant could not afford an attorney and was required to resist the false 
charges, his government and the Star Chamber Court in Propria Persona. 
The Appellant believes that he travels the public highways as a matter of right and 
objects to his status being reduced to that of a corporate creature created by the State, 
which uses the public highways as a matter of privilege and is subject civilly and criminally 
to every whim of the police power and it's creator, the State. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the "right to travel" a right "granted" Citizens by the State and Federal 
Constitutions as stated in Salina v. Wisden, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1987), or is the right of 
a Citizen to travel a fundamental, inalienable right "guaranteed" by those constitutions? 
2. Does the possession of a State Drivers License by a Citizen pursuant to by 
U.C.A. 41-2-104 (1953 as amended) relegate "The right of a Citizen to travel upon the 
public highways and transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and 
business" and "a common right which he has under right to enjoy life and liberty," 
Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583, (1930), free from license, tax or fee's; thus 
converting the citizen's right under the Fifth and Ninth to the Federal Constitution to the 
same status as that of a corporate creature or juristic person who is subject to it's 
creator's every whim and must hire professional, licensed "Drivers" in order to travel upon 
the public highways and then may do so only as a matter of privilege? 
3. Does Article III, Section 2, Clauses 1 and 2 of the U.S. Constitution require 
that the U.S. Supreme Court have original jurisdiction in controversies between states and 
Citizens of any state, are the "People of the State" the injured party when a criminal act 
is committed, and are the "People of the State" alleged to be injured and held to be 
victims when a Citizen merely exceeds a certain speed and harms no one by doing so? 
4. Recognizing that in the event of an injury, damage, loss or trespass, he may 
be held accountable for the damage; does a State Citizen have the right to travel the 
public highways in a safe and prudent manner even if he exceeds an arbitrarily assigned 
posted speed limit? 
5. Does a State Citizen have the right to travel the public highways in a safe 
and prudent manner when he does not exceed the 85th percentile speed of the traffic as 
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measured by an engineering and traffic investigation in accordance with U.C.A. 41-6-47 
(1953 as amended)? 
6. Can a Citizen be charged with, and found guilty of a "crime," merely by 
traveling at a speed greater than posted, and absent conclusive evidence that his speed 
alone was unreasonable and imprudent? 
7. Does a State Citizen commit a crime and/or is there a cause of action if 
while exercising his right to travel on a public highway he exceeds the posted speed limit, 
but he does no damage, causes no injury, commits no trespass, causes no hazard, 
makes no threat to another person or property, has no specific intent and no injured 
person signs a complaint? 
8. Was the Defendant deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right of 
confronting his accuser when the courts below refused to allow the Defendant to 
introduce impeaching evidence of prior inconsistent statements, false swearing, perjury 
and prejudice on the part of the accuser and only witness? 
9. Was the Defendant denied Due Process when the arresting officer wrote 
immaterial and irrelevant prejudicial statements on the complaint and because the court 
below received that prejudicial, immaterial and irrelevant statements into evidence? 
10. Was the Defendant denied Due Process and his constitutionally guaranteed 
right under the Sixth Amendment, to confront and cross-examine his accuser, when the 
court below denied Defendant his Right of Discovery of the officer's notes made at the 
scene of the arrest-made at the moment of the issuance of the citation by the arresting 
officer while "in the line of duty" and while on duty? 
11. Was defendant denied his right to Due Process and his constitutionally 
guaranteed right to confront and cross-examine his accuser when, representing himself 
in Propria Persona, the court below would not sustain his objections to the inappropriate, 
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unresponsive and flippant answers on the part of the accusing officer, and the court was 
generally intolerant and unresponsive to Defendant's requests for help in ascertaining the 
truth from the State's principle and only witness? 
12. Was Defendant, acting in Propria Persona, denied Due Process and a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial, when he demanded that the officer answer 
his questions and the court refused to compel the officer to answer, then found the 
Defendant guilty of Contempt of Court for making that demand of the officer? 
13. Was the Defendant denied Due Process and his constitutionally guaranteed 
right to confront and cross-examine his accuser when two of the three material witnesses, 
who are employees of the State, failed to obey lawful subpoenas to appear at the trial and 
another, who did appear, failed to bring documents requested in "subpoena duces tecum" 
which were material to the Defendant's defense, and when requested, the court below 
refused to compel their appearance, hold them in contempt, or postpone the trial? 
14. Can the Defendant be made to pay witness fees to a witness who is a State 
employee and called during business hours which requirement to so pay was ordered by 
the judge and requested by the prosecutor, or is U.C.A. 21-5-15 (1953 as amended) still 
in effect? 
15. Should the Defendant be compelled to pay fees to witnesses in a criminal 
contempt trial, when those called were witnesses to the fact, or is U.C.A. 21-5-14 (1953 
as amended) in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights in the Constitution of 
Utah and of the United States? 
16. Was the Defendant denied Due Process when the court below denied his 
request for "rights sua sponte"? 
17. Was the Defendant denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial 
by an "impartial jury of his peers," concerning his right to "voir dire" his jury, when the 
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court denied the Defendant the right to personally ask the prospective jurors questions 
necessary to determine whether they were indeed impartial or whether they were, in fact, 
prejudiced against the Defendant, and if they were, in fact, prejudiced, or became so by 
statements by the court; could such jurors be deemed to constitute "a jury of his peers"? 
18. Was Defendant denied Due Process and his constitutionally guaranteed right 
by having to pay for the trial transcripts which he could not do thus detrimentally affecting 
his right to appeal? 
19. Where an individual, through circumstances beyond his control, has 
insufficient income to support himself; cannot find steady work within the State; is supplied 
food and lodging by another, and could not possibly save or borrow the funds to pay for 
the required trial transcripts; can that individual be deemed as not impecunious, where 
that determination was based solely on the mere fact that he "lives in a house and has 
access to a motor vehicle," or can only the homeless and beggars be deemed 
impecunious pursuant to U.C.A. 21-7-3 (1953 as amended)? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is quite similar to Case No. 870464-CA with all of the same players 
except the judge. The Defendant/Appellant was traveling on U.S. 89, a four-lane, divided 
expressway, east of Layton, Utah. The Appellant was stopped by the same Sgt. Owen 
Busch of the Utah Highway Patrol. In fact it was only about 30 days after the Precinct 
Court trial of the first case. When Officer Busch walked up to the Appellant's car, he said 
that he was going to teach the Appellant a lesson. The Appellant attempted to find out 
the "probable cause" and if he was in custody. The Appellant was very fearful that the 
officer meant to do him harm. The officer told Baker, the Appellant, that he was under 
arrest and dragged him from the car. To save himself from further rough handling, the 
Appellant showed his Drivers License. The Appellant was then charged with traveling 65 
mph in a 55 mph posted area. 
It was a beautiful Saturday, about 2 p.m. in the afternoon. There were no other 
cars on the two southbound lanes within one-half mile in front or behind us. The little 
white sports car (UHP Mustang) had pulled up beside the Appellant, but about 15 feet 
behind him in the outside southbound lane, a few hundred feet south of the Hill Field 
Road. The UHP vehicle remained in the position of "blind spot" in the right lane for about 
20 seconds, then the driver must have applied his brakes and backed off. The Appellant 
was in the left lane and prefers to be in right lane so that the other traffic may pass on the 
left. The white UHP vehicle had pulled up very fast at the time the Appellant was about 
to change to the right lane. The Appellant was unable to observe that the white vehicle 
was a UHP Mustang or see it's insignia on the side. The Appellant remembers being 
slightly irritated that the white car didn't go on past him so that he could move to the right 
lane. A few seconds later, when he checked the right lane, the white car was several 
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hundred feet behind, as if he had thrown on his brakes. Without any further ado, the 
Appellant moved over to the right lane with his cruise control still set on 62 mph. He did 
notice the white car about 400 or 500 feet behind him a couple of times. The odd part 
was that there were no other cars near us for at least one-quarter mile. (As a civil 
engineer, the Appellant prides himself on judging distances.) 




1. WHERE "TRAVEL" IS AN INALIENABLE RIGHT INHERENT IN ALL STATE 
CITIZENS, IT CANNOT BE CLAIMED TO BE A RIGHT "GRANTED" BY ANY 
CONSTITUTION, WHERE A CONSTITUTION IS AN ORGANIC ACT OF THE CITIZENS, 
AND AS SUCH, THE FULL PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO SECURE AND PROTECT THE 
INHERENT RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN IN HIS LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY FROM THE 
USURPATION AND OPPRESSION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. 
a. In the recent case of Salina v. Wisden, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, (1987), 
the Supreme Court of Utah appears to have erred where in it was 
held that the "right to travel" is a right granted to Citizens by the State 
and Federal Constitutions. It is well-settled that constitutions are 
organic acts of the people and as such their means do not change. 
That which was meant when those constitutions were drafted is meant 
today. The original intent of the framers of these documents was 
solely to secure and protect the God-given rights inherent in all people 
by virtue of their birth and existence in this nation. As those 
constitutions cannot, therefore, "grant" any rights that are endowed 
by the creator, can it be claimed by judicial determination that they 
can? 
While not specifically enumerated in either constitution, it must 
be recognized that the inherent "right to travel" is included among the 
vast numbers of rights meant to be secured and protected by 
operation of the language contained in the Ninth Amendment, and 
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further guaranteed by the liberty clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
The Constitution must, by virtue of its very nature, be a 
"negative" document, owing to the fact that it is essentially impossible 
to enumerate every possible right imaginable that the people wish to 
secure to themselves and protect from the encroachment of the 
government they created. Conversely, the limited powers that were 
deemed necessary to be granted to government were "positive" or 
specifically enumerated. 
A legislative body cannot claim to have the power to enlarge 
upon those powers granted to it by the Constitution since the power 
to legislate emanates therefrom and from that authority alone it derives 
the power to enact laws. Such laws cannot operate to subrogate or 
abrogate any right inherent in the people from birth. The creature of 
government cannot exceed its creator-the people. 
Inasmuch as the negative cannot be proven, the Court of 
Appeals is thought to furnish the Appellant the basis of jurisdiction 
claimed by the lower court over his person in the case at bar simply 
by citing the Wisden court's determination that the "right to travel" is 
a "right granted by the constitutions" both Federal and State, in light 
of evidence to the contrary. 
"No court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever will, 
of acquiring jurisdiction by fiction...it is evident that we are not 
to assume a voluntary jurisdiction, because we think, or others 
might think, it may be exercised innocently, or even wisely." 
Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. 308, 311, 312, (1797). 
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In Saiina v. Wisden, supra., the Utah Supreme Court states: "In order 
for our scheme of ordered liberties to succeed, we must obey valid 
laws, even those with which we do not agree" id., pg. 3. Do they 
mean that the Citizen is required to obey all valid laws whether they 
apply to him or not. If the State statute requires a Citizen to have a 
license to do something he already has a right to do, is the statute a 
valid law when it pertains to the Citizen? 
The high court's words "scheme of ordered liberties" indicates 
that the personal liberties of the Citizens may be controlled, regulated 
and even organized like an army general would train and organize his 
troops, or like the legislature can train and regulate their creatures. 
This country became the greatest on earth because of the freedoms 
and liberties of the people, not because they were regimented by a 
"scheme of ordered liberties." 
A Citizen is a free and natural person, a sovereign, having and 
enjoying all his inalienable, political and civil rights within a country. 
Citizen is the term used to describe the highest status obtainable by 
an individual in a country. A man's status is his position as a lawful 
man. Some individuals have the status of subject, member, public 
servant, alien, ward, felon, and many more. Each status lesser than 
a Citizen has accepted some privileges or committed some crime 
which subjects him to more regulation and restriction within the 
society than that of a free citizen. A natural, free person has the 
status of a Citizen, not because he is human, but because he has 
inalienable rights, immunities, duties and responsibilities ascribed to 
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him. If he waives those rights he may have a lower status. The 
fictitious persons are the juristic creatures, corporations, etc., who act 
as a matter of privilege. 
The right of a Citizen to travel is probably best explained in Thompson 
v. Smith. 
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and 
to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life 
and business is a common right which he has under right to 
enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to 
pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing 
to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and 
under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive 
a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an 
automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life 
and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the moving of a 
house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, 
which a city may permit or prohibit at will." 
Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583, (1930). 
According to the following cases and constitutional cites the courts 
have no jurisdiction over Citizens unless there is damage, loss, injury, 
trespass, intent or threat to harm a person or property, or an injured 
person signs a complaint. Sovereignty over government is with the 
people. Sovereignty over the corporations, their drivers and all 
regulated industry who organize under the state statues; is with the 
State. Corporations are creatures created by the state. 
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the 
author and source of law; but in our system while sovereign 
powers are delegated to agencies of government, sovereignty 
itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all 
government exists and acts. And the Law is the definition and 
limitation of power." ...of government Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 370, (1885). (Underlined words added.) 
"The sole object and only legitimate end of government is to 
protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property; 
and when the government assumes other functions it is 
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usurpation and oppression." (Alabama Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 
35). 
'This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof;---shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the contrary notwithstanding." (U.S. Constitution, Art. VI). 
"The words life, liberty and property are constitutional terms 
and are to be taken in the broadest sense. They indicate the 
three great subdivisions of all civil rights. The term property 
in this clause embraces all valuable interests which a man may 
possess outside of himself, and that is to say outside of his 
life and liberty. It is not confined to mere technical property, 
but literally to every species of vested right." Campbell v. Holt, 
115 U.S. 620, (1985). (Dissenting opinion.) 
"Although the Articles of Confederation provided that the 
people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and 
from any other state, that right finds no explicit mention in the 
Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right 
so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a 
necessary commitment of the stronger Union the Constitution 
created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United 
States has long been recognized as a basic right under the 
Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, (1908); Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160,177 (1941), (concurring opinion), 181 
(concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1,6-8; 12-
16 (1958), (dissenting opinion)." United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745, 758, (1965). 
IN REGARDS TO JURISDICTION OVER THE CITIZEN AND 
RECOGNIZING "THERE IS A CLEAR DISTINCTION IN THIS 
PARTICULAR BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL AND A CORPORATION...," 
HALEV. HINKLE, SUPRA.; IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ILLEGAL AND 
UNLAWFUL TO FORCE THE CITIZEN TO SUBMIT TO THE SAME 
LICENSES AND CONTROLS AS THAT OF AN ALIEN, CREATURE OR 
JURISTIC PERSON, I.E.; DRIVER'S LICENSE, AUTO REGISTRATION, 
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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES, AND POLICE INTERFERENCE IN 
THE PRIVATE AND BUSINESS LIVES OF THE CITIZENS. 
2. THE POSSESSION OF A VALID STATE DRIVERS LICENSE BY A CITIZEN 
AS REQUIRED BY U.C.A., 41-2-104 (1953 AS AMENDED) APPARENTLY RELEGATES 
THE "RIGHT OF A CITIZEN TO TRAVEL UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND 
TRANSPORT HIS PROPERTY THEREON IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LIFE AND 
BUSINESS" AND REQUIRES THE CITIZEN TO WAIVE HIS "COMMON RIGHT WHICH HE 
HAS UNDER RIGHT TO ENJOY LIFE AND LIBERTY." THOMPSON V. SMITH, SUPRA. AT 
PG. 583. WITHOUT THAT RIGHT THE CITIZEN ASSUMES THE SAME STATUS AS THAT 
OF A CORPORATE CREATURE OR JURISTIC PERSON WHO IS SUBJECT TO ITS 
CREATOR'S EVERY WHIM OR "SCHEME OF ORDERED LIBERTY." WITHOUT THAT 
RIGHT HE MAY BE REGULATED AS IF HE WERE A HIRED PROFESSIONAL, LICENSED 
"DRIVER" AND MAY TRAVEL UPON THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS ONLY AS A MATTER OF 
PRIVILEGE. 
a. For years the State has lied to and threatened the Citizens by 
intimidation and duress to obtain a "Drivers License." The State told 
the Citizens that driving on the public highways was a privilege which 
could be withdrawn by the State at any time. Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary, 1914 Edition, defines the difference between a Driver and 
Traveler. 
(1) Driver: "One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, 
wagon, or other vehicle with horses, mules, or other animals." 
(2) Employed: "The act of doing a thing, and being under 
contract or orders to do it." 
(3) Traveler: "One who passes from place to place, whether for 
pleasure, instruction, business or health." 
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When the court refers to a "Driver," hired by contract to move freight 
for a profit on the public right-of-way, they know that he is "driving as 
a matter of privilege and not as a matter of right." 
There are over 80 cases by state Supreme Courts that state: "To 
travel is a common right." To stop a Citizen when there has been no 
crime, loss or complaint the government must have a civil power or 
authority over him. The Organic Law states that before a Territory 
can qualify to become a State, it must provide: 
"for extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious 
liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their 
laws and constitutions are erected; to fix and establish those 
principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions and 
governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the 
said Territory;" (Section 13, Northwest Territorial Ordinance, 
Volume 1, U.S. Code.) 
The State has civil jurisdiction over the creatures it created but not the 
Citizens who are the author and source of law. 
The lower courts are convinced there is no difference between an 
individual or Citizen and a corporate creature or juristic person. 
A common right may not be taxed, licensed or fee'd and since 
the right to travel is a common right for the individual, it is illegal to 
require that they carry a license or be taxed for using that right. 
The street belongs to the public and are primarily for the use 
of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes 
of gain is special and extraordinary and generally at least, may 
be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature deems proper." 
Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144, (1923). 
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be 
converted into a crime." Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489, 
(1956). 
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"The privilege of using the streets and highways by the 
operation thereon of motor carriers for hire can be acquired 
only by permission or license from the State or its political 
subdivision." (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., page 830.) 
"We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this 
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the 
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for 
an examination at the suit of the State. The individual may 
stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled 
to carry on his private business in his way. His power to 
contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his 
neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an 
investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes 
no duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, 
beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are 
such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the 
organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by 
due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. 
Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the 
immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure 
except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to the 
public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights. 
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is creature of the State. 
It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. 
It receives certain special privileges and franchises and holds 
them subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its 
charter. Its powers are limited by law." Hale v. Hinkle, 201 
U.S. 43, 74, (1906). 
d. When there is no distinction between the personal "Drivers License" 
and the "Drivers License" required for the professional driver who is 
hired to drive one of the creatures' vehicles; and no difference in the 
vehicle license plates, it indicates that we are all in the same class 
and have the same status. 
If this Citizen has in any way waived any of his rights by 
possessing a State "Drivers License," he demands to know about it. 
The Appellant recognizes his responsibility to travel in such a way that 
17 
he will not cause harm to anyone and that if he causes harm, he may 
be held responsible. 
e. The legislative justification of the Licensing Statute is that of 
improving the safety of the highways. Denial of the rights of the 
Citizens doesn't improve safety nor does it protect the public 
consistent with the purpose of the police power. The responsibility 
of the city, county or state to establish traffic rules does two things: 
(1) It establishes a standard by which all travelers may use as a guide 
to improve the traffic, to flow smoother, faster and at higher volumes, 
and (2) in case of an accident it helps the insurance companies and 
the courts establish fault. Police power cannot be used to collect 
revenue, especially in the name of public safety. 
f. Blackstone states, "Next to personal security, the law of England 
regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. 
This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion of changing 
situations, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own 
inclinations may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by 
due course of law (common law)." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (page 
42) it says that liberty is "freedom from restraint. The faculty of willing, 
and the power of doing what has been willed, without influence from 
without!" 
The following court cases further substantiate the right to travel 
freely on the highways of all the States of the United States of 
America. 
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"Automobiles are LAWFUL means of conveyance, and have 
equal rights upon public roads with horses and carriages 
...(and) the operator of an automobile and a pedestrian have 
reciprocal rights and DUTIES, and although each has the right 
to PASS and REPASS, neither must so negligently exercise that 
right so as to injure the other." Hennessy v. Taylor, 76 NE 224 
(Mass. 1905). 
"It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that appellant was guilty 
of negligence from merely using an automobile as a means of 
conveyance on the public highway. The law does not 
denounce motor carriages as such on the public way..." 
Indiana Springs v. Brown, 1 LRA NS 238 at 241, (1905). 
"...a license is a mere means of regulation...the order in 
question was void in singling out automobiles by name, and 
placing them under the ban of OUTLAWRY, when, as a matter 
of common observation and scientific knowledge there is less 
danger in propelling an automobile than there is in driving a 
horse and buggy." And "Class legislation discriminating against 
some and favoring others is prohibited." Christy v. Elliot, 216 
III. 46, (1905). 
"...there is nothing new or exceptional in the principles of law 
that apply to their (automobiles) use on the highways...the 
owner of an automobile has the SAME RIGHT as the owner of 
other vehicles to use the highways or streets of a city...owners 
of automobiles have the same rights in the roads and streets 
as the drivers of horses." House v. Cramer, 112 NW 3, (1907). 
"The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of 
national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against State interference. 
Privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are 
only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of 
the National Government, or are specifically granted or secured 
to all citizens or persons by the Constitution of the United 
States. ...the right of national citizenship is the right to pass 
freely from State to State... We are all citizens of the United 
States; and as members of the same community, must have 
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without 
interruption, as freely as in our own States." Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941). 
Chief Justice Fuller, in Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 at 274 (1900) 
stated: 
"Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from 
one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of 
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personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit FROM 
OR THROUGH the territory of any State is a right secured by 
the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the 
Constitution." (See Petition for Remand and Review No. 32.) 
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there 
can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate 
them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491, (1966). 
IF POSSESSION OF A "DRIVER'S LICENSE" IN ANY WAY 
RELEGATES OR REDUCES THE RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN TO THAT 
OF A PRIVILEGE, THE PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW IT. 
3. ARTICLE III, SECTION 2, CLAUSE 1 AND 2 OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
STATES CLEARLY THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
IN CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES AND CITIZENS OF ANY STATE. WHEN THE 
PEOPLE ARE THE VICTIMS OR INJURED PARTY, THE STATE CANNOT BE THE 
PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE CITIZEN OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION. 
a. The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 
and 2 states: 
'The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States. 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
authority; ...to controversies between two or more States; 
...and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects. 
"In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
consuls and those in which a State shall be a party, the 
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." (Underlining 
added.) 
This case is between a State and a Citizen, it would appear to the 
Appellant that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction. This can 
easily be shown by simply diagraming either of the two clauses of 
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Article III, Section 2 according to any standard method of teaching 
English. The case of City of Salina v. Wisden, supra, at pg. 3, 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah; fails to prove 
jurisdiction of the court over this particular case or the Citizen and 
cannot effect a remedy. 
Salina v. Wisden, supra, at pg. 3 states: "In order for our scheme of 
ordered liberties to succeed, we must all obey valid laws, even those 
with which we do not agree;" I take it that "valid" means laws 
pertaining to the Defendant. It is a valid law that "All aliens must 
register at the nearest post office." That may be a valid law for aliens. 
"All persons must register for the draft" may be a valid law for those 
young men between certain ages, but does it pertain to me? All 
drivers must have a "Driver's License" but, does that pertain to 
travelers who are traveling as a matter of right? 
Valid statutes are those that are not repugnant to the Law: meaning 
the Organic Law as found in Volume I of the U.S. Code. Those 
statutes that do not have roots in the Organic Law are null and void 
per the U.S. Supreme Court. No statutes may violate the Citizen's 
inalienable rights or immunities, or they are unconstitutional. 
The people can only give to the State power and authority they 
have. They cannot give the State authority they don't have. Since 
a Citizen has no power or authority to stop another Citizen using the 
public Right-of-Way for what it was intended, how could they give that 
authority to a government. "Sovereignty itself is, of course, not 
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subject to law, for it is the author and source of law;" Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, supra, at 370. 
d. The state, county and municipalities may, "under its police power, 
regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not 
arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it." Thompson v. Smith, 
supra, at pg. 583. In the higher courts opinion, it is "Search and 
Seizure" under the Fourth Amendment when any police officer stops 
a "Citizen" and his complaint has no substance, no loss, victim, intent 
or there has been no crime committed. 
"But whenever the operation and effect of any general 
regulation is to extinguish or destroy that by which the law of 
the land is the property of any person, so far as it has that 
effect; it is considered as being deprivation of property within 
the meaning of this Constitutional guarantee if it deprives an 
owner of one of its essential attributes, destroys its value, 
restricts or interrupts its common, necessary or profitable use, 
hampers the owner in the application of it to the purpose of 
trade, or imposes conditions upon the right to hold, or use it 
and thereby seriously impairs its value." (Constitutional Law, 
16 AM JUR. 2d, Const. Law, Section 369.) 
e. There can be no remedy in the court because no person or entity was 
injured. To pay anyone, even the State for a loss or damage that 
never was is not only not a remedy, it is unlawful and ludicrous. This 
is not to say that the State may not tax, fine, bully, or harass the 
creatures it created in every way it decides; because the State granted 
that privilege to them. 
4. A STATE CITIZEN HAS THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY 
IN A SAFE AND PRUDENT MANNER EVEN THOUGH HE EXCEEDS THE ARBITRARILY 
ASSIGNED POSTED SPEED LIMIT? 
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A State Citizen travels on the public highway as a matter of right. 
The Right of Locomotion was the law of the land long before this 
State of Utah was organized. 
"He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing 
therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His 
rights are such as existed by the law of the land long 
antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be 
taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with 
the Constitution. The individual may stand upon his 
constitutional rights as a citizen." Hale v. Hinkle, supra, at pg. 
74. 
The posted speed limit on the four-lane expressway, with two traffic 
lanes going each direction divided by a median varying from 16 ft. to 
30 ft. with provisions for left and right lanes, was 55 mph. The 
highway (U.S. 89) was posted at 65 mph in 1973 and was designed 
for 70 mph traffic with 2,300 vehicles per hour per lane (vehicles 1.5 
seconds apart in each lane). 
How can the State justify the 55 mph speed limit as being 
"reasonable and prudent" when almost 100% of the vehicles on the 
road exceed that speed. All travelers and drivers must be acting in 
a criminal manner with intent to commit a crime. Is it reasonable for 
the State to establish a speed limit that no one will adhere to? 
How can the State justify on the basis of public safety a 
situation where a police officer traveling at 55 mph can cause a log-
jam of vehicles around and behind him in just 2 or 3 miles. The traffic 
traveling at an unreasonably slow speed causes the vehicles to bunch 
up and follow at only 30 or 40 feet behind the vehicles in front of them 
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causing a potentially serious condition. A free flowing stream of traffic 
is by far the safer condition and every traffic engineer knows it. 
c. U.S.C.A. Title 23 (1973) (West Supp. 1989), Section 154 "National 
Maximum Speed Limit" states: 
"(a) the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any 
project under Section 106 in any State which (1) a maximum 
speed limit on any public highway within its jurisdiction in 
excess of fifty-five miles per hour, or (2)...." 
By blackmail, duress and coercion, the federal government has 
broken through the defenses of the States (Articles IX and X of the 
Bill of Rights) and is now coercing the States into harassing their own 
Citizens. The State has legislated statutes on the pretense that they 
are for the protection of the public, when in reality the only object is 
to make the Citizens more subservient and reduce them the same 
status as a creature. Our State has happily joined with our federal 
government in gaining tighter control over the sheeple. A flock of 
sheep are much easier to manage than a bunch of goats or wild 
burros that like to go their own way and do their own thing. 
d. Speed limit signs are not substantive law, they are beneficially used 
as guides or warnings for up-coming curves, schools or hazards 
where the traffic should use extra caution? Today it seems that 
"reasonable and prudent" is not what the public does or thinks it is, 
but what the police, public servants and the courts think it is. 
e. Among the worst fears for most people is to be stopped by a 
policeman and/or be called into court. 
24 
THE CITIZENS HAVE A RIGHT TO TRAVEL THEIR PUBLIC HIGHWAY 
WITHOUT FEAR AND HARASSMENT BY OUR POLICE. 
5. U.C.A. 41-6-47 (1953 AS AMENDED) REQUIRES THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION (UDOT), BY MEANS OF AN "ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC 
INVESTIGATION," TO DETERMINE A PRIMA FACIE REASONABLE OR SAFE SPEED 
FOR OUR PUBLIC HIGHWAYS. THE HIGHWAY IS POSTED AT THE SPEED OF THE 
85TH PERCENTILE. (SEE EXHIBIT "E".) 
a. That 85th percentile of the traffic speed on the subject expressway 
was established as being 65 mph many years ago and regular 
monitoring of the speeds today, with the 55 mph posted speed limit, 
there is no change. Apparently there is a 10 mph differential between 
the posted speed and what UDOT has found to be "reasonable and 
prudent." 
What is the object of U.C.A. 41-6-47 (1953 as amended) if the 
State, UDOT, the police and the courts completely ignore it? Should 
some of the traffic statues be enforced while others are ignored? 
How long can the higher courts ignore the rights of the people? 
Does it have to go on until Utah becomes a Police State? That isn't 
very long because we already are a Police State. Are the higher court 
judges willing to enslave their own posterity along with the rest of the 
citizenry? It should be recognized that being a judge is only a 
temporary position in life. In that position, you can help the people 
to freedom or further enslave them and let the public servants and 
lower courts treat them as they will-with disgust and contempt. You 
have the temporary power to remedy this situation. 
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6. WHEN THERE ARE NO TRAFFIC HAZARDS, RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS 
OR OTHER POSSIBLE INTERFERENCES THAT COULD CAUSE INJURY, HARM OR 
TRESPASS ON ANOTHER'S RIGHTS; A CITIZEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL 
AT MUCH HIGHER SPEEDS THAT IS NOW RECOGNIZED AS BEING REASONABLE 
AND PRUDENT BY THE POLICE, LOWER COURTS AND THE POSTED SPEED LIMIT 
FORCED UPON THE STATE'S CITIZENS BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
a. The Appellant attempted to submit several of the following State 
Supreme Court cases in his defense and as jury instructions. They 
were all denied, mostly because they were cases from other states, 
according to the prosecutor. 
State v. Trimming is an Idaho case in which the defendant 
was convicted in District Court of driving at a speed greater than was 
reasonable and prudent. Idaho Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and Justice Smith wrote the majority opinion: 
"[5-7] I.C. Sec. 40-701 does not prohibit the driving in excess 
of the limits specified. But if one does so drive, then he must 
assume the burden of proving that in so driving he was not 
unreasonable or imprudent under the conditions to which the 
statute refers. And if his evidence shows that no condition 
existed either actual, potential, or at all, which would render his 
speed 'greater than is reasonable and prudent' then the burden 
of proof, of overcoming the prima facie presumption of 
unreasonable and imprudent driving, is fully met. There being 
no evidence of unreasonable or imprudent driving 'under the 
conditions' then appellant was entitled to acquittal of the charge 
of unreasonable and imprudent driving, as a matter of law, the 
evidence being insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the 
court's finding of unreasonable and imprudent driving 'under 
the facts as set forth in said stipulation.'" (Pages 121 and 122) 
State v. Trimmings, 406 P. 2d 118 (Idaho, 1965). (Underlining 
added.) 
In reversing a conviction, the Massachusetts Court, as quoted in State 
v. Trimming also said: 
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"The real question in all these cases is not whether the speed 
is greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to 
traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public, the 
burden being on the [State] to show that it was. If the speed 
was such as to make out a prima facie case for the 
prosecution, still the burden does not change. The jury are to 
give due weight to the prima facie case taken in connection 
with the other circumstances disclosed by the testimony...and 
if they are satisfied that the speed is greater than was 
reasonable and proper, having regard to traffic and the use of 
the way and the safety of the public, they should convict the 
defendant; otherwise they should acquit him. And hence in 
some cases a defendant may be convicted even if he has not 
exceeded the rate named in the prima facie clauses of the 
statute, and in some he may be acquitted even though he may 
have exceeded it." (95 N.E. at 215-216, a 1911 case 209 Mass. 
24, 95 N.E. 214), State v. Trimmings, 406 P. 2d, 118, (1965). 
(Underlining added.) 
The Illinois Court, in reversing a judgement of conviction on a charge 
of having violated the posted speed limit similar to U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) said: 
"...Upon proof of driving at a speed in excess of the posted 
speed limits a rebuttable presumption is raised that the statute 
has been violated, and this presumption is sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case on the part of the State. The 
defendant may then introduce evidence to attack the basic fact 
upon which the presumption is based, that the defendant was 
driving at a speed in excess of the posted speed limits, or the 
defendant by his evidence may show that the conditions 
existing at the time and place of the arrest with reference to 
traffic condition of the roadway, etc., were such that he would 
be taken out of the purview of the statute. The State 
throughout the case has the duty of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant was driving at a speed in 
violation of the specific statutory provisions, and unless the 
State sustains that burden there should be a finding of not 
guilty. All that the presumption which is raised by a violation 
of the posted speed limit does is to create a prima facie case, 
and, standing alone and with no conflicting evidence, it would 
be sufficient to support a judgement. This presumption fails 
when the testimony of the State's witnesses is inconsistent with 
the presumption and in its very essence rebuts it." People v. 
Perlman, 15 III. App. 2d 239, 145 N.E. 2d 762, (1957). 
(Underlining added.) 
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The Ohio Court in reversing a judgement of conviction on a charge 
laid under the statute, said: 
"...merely to operate (a motor vehicle) outside of a municipality 
at a speed greater than 50 miles an hour is not a violation of 
the law that being only prima facie and the other provisions of 
the statute must be met as every person is presumed to be 
innocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of all the essential elements of the crime charged." State v. 
Hale, 109 N.E. 2d 588,590, (Ohio, 1952). (Underlining added.) 
The Ohio Court stated in the headnote 185 N.E. 2d at 125: 
"...we conclude that the gist of the offense is whether the 
speed in question is greater or less than is reasonable and 
proper under the conditions specified in Section 4511.21, 
supra, and that the particular speeds made prima facie lawful 
or unlawful are just what they are called, prima facie evidence 
to be considered along with the other evidence in the case in 
determining the ultimate question whether the speed is 
reasonable and proper." State v. Wall, 115 Ohio App. 323,185 
N.E. 2d 115, 125, (1962). (Underlining added.) 
In considering the evidence the Court stated: 
"... the great weight of the testimony is to the effect that it was 
not raining and had not been for several hours; that the road 
was dry; that it was wide and, there being no evidence to the 
contrary, may be assumed to be satisfactorily smooth; that 
there were no crossroads and in the entire three miles only 
three roads which dead end into Highway 257; that the speed 
traveled was between 55 and 60 miles an hour; that the motor 
vehicle was nearly new and in good condition; for which reason 
the judgement of conviction must be reversed upon the weight 
of the evidence." State v. Wall, id. at pg. 125. 
Olinykv. People, 642 P. 2d 490, (Colo. 1981). "The effect of 
proof that a driver exceeded a prima facie speed limit is to 
raise a rebuttable presumption that the driver's speed 
exceeded what was reasonable or prudent under the 
circumstances." State v. Rich, 563 P. 2d 918, (Ariz. 1977). "If, 
however, the driver's speed is the only evidence submitted by 
the prosecution, the defendant submits evidence sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, a court may rule 
that defendant's speed, while in excess of the posted speed 
limit, was legal under the circumstances existing at the time." 
State v. Trimmings, 89 Idaho 440, 406 P. 2d 118, (1965). 
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"What is a reasonable rate of speed under existing conditions 
must always be determined very largely on how much control 
the driver can maintain while driving at such rate." Horsley v. 
Robinson, 168 P. 2d, 592, 596, (Utah, 1947). 
In Cardon v. Brenchley the Plaintiff appealed the lower court's decision 
that there was ng_ cause for action. The defendant's vehicle was 
traveling east on 900 South at 7500 West in Salt Lake Citv. The 
plaintiff's vehicle made a right hand turn onto 900 South and headed 
east in the right hand lane. The plaintiff signaled left and immediately 
turned into the left lane which is the lane that the defendant was 
traveling. The defendant was traveling at a rate of speed of 70 miles 
per hour. When the plaintiff turned onto 900 South the defendant 
started slowing and, at the point that the defendant's vehicle collided 
with the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant was going at a rate of speed 
of 60 mph. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower 
court in not awarding damages to plaintiff. Phillip Fishier was the 
attorney for the defendant. In writing the majority opinion, Justice 
Crockett wrote: 
"(1) it is true that our statutes provide that driving in excess of 
certain stated speeds is prima facie evidence that such speed 
is greater than that which is reasonable and prudent under the 
circumstance; and it is also true that this may constitute prima 
facie evidence of negligence. However, that is not conclusive. 
The overriding principle governing negligence is the exercise 
of the degree of care which an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent person would exercise under the circumstances." 
Cardon v. Brenchley, 575, P. 2d 184, (Utah, 1978). 
(Underlining added.) 
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The Utah Supreme Court found no negligence on the part of the 
defendant even though there had been an accident and that the 
defendant was traveling faster than the posted speed, 
b. U.S. 89 through east Layton has normally varies from 76 feet to 90 
feet of pavement including 8 foot paved shoulders which are used for 
all deceleration and acceleration lanes on the right side of the traffic 
lanes. The paved median which varies from 16 feet to 30 feet is used 
for left turns. 
On that fateful Saturday afternoon, about 2 p.m. the road was 
dry and weather was beautiful. The southbound vehicles averaged 
about a half-mile apart. The expressway was more like a major 
aircraft runway except for the lane striping and an occasional 
northbound vehicle. 
If there had been an emergency, most travelers could have 
traveled safely in excess of 80 mph over this section of road. Any 
police officer would not hesitate to go 100 or even 120 mph and often 
do in conditions far worse. So what is a reasonable and prudent 
speed? 
When Sgt. Busch stopped the Appellant the first time on 1-15 
in "moderately heavy" traffic (actually a log-jam of about 50 cars) on 
a very dark night in February, the Appellant watched him in the 
rearview mirror come from 500 feet back in the inside lane of the 
three-lane Interstate doing well over 100 mph. He was passing 
vehicles traveling 55 mph in the adjacent lane, as if they were 
stopped. Was that safe, reasonable or prudent? The officer thought 
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so and so did the lower courts. You must have thought so too when 
you refused to answer every issue in Case No. 870464 CA, except 
Salina v. Wisden. (If appeal of Case No. 870464-CA was "insufficiently 
coherent" as the CA stated, very few citizens have the language or 
writing ability to plea for justice pursuant to Utah State Constitution, 
Art. I, Sections 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 
27.) (So where do the citizens go to redress grievances?) The police 
jeopardize the safety of the public often in the name of safety and 
protection of the public. Questions concerning these acts are not 
allowed to be asked in the lower courts, because our police are just 
"doing their job" by apprehending dastardly criminals. More 
accurately they are "harassing the people and eating of their 
substance." (Declaration of Independence.) 
7. A CITIZEN, WHO ACTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND IS NOT A JURISTIC 
PERSON, CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF A TRAFFIC INFRACTION (CALLED A CRIME) 
WITHOUT THERE BEING A LOSS, DAMAGE, THREAT, TRESPASS, INJURY TO 
PROPERTY OR PERSON, SPECIFIC INTENT TO CAUSE HARM AND A COMPLAINT 
SIGNED BY THE INJURED PARTY. 
a. In this instant case there were none of the above. There were only 
two lonely vehicles 500 feet apart traveling south in the west lane of 
a four-lane expressway with two southbound lanes. The nearest 
southbound vehicles were at least one-quarter mile ahead and behind. 
b. The prosecutor had no interest in proving intent. Apparently he knew 
it wasn't necessary to prove intent because he "lumps" the Citizens 
in with juristic corporations who use our public highways for profit and 
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gain. Is the proof of intent a necessary condition for establishing that 
a crime was committed? Can it be otherwise when it pertains to a 
Citizen? 
c. Isn't it true that the court, in order to have jurisdiction, must be able 
to affect a remedy? To the Appellant that means reimburse the 
damaged person. Who was damaged? To pay any compensation 
to an entity who incurred no loss, injury, threat or damage cannot be 
considered a remedy. It could easily be considered ransom or 
extortion, but certainly not a remedy because the State had no loss 
for which they should be reimbursed. The court and prosecutor 
admitted that the State had incurred no loss. 
NO CITIZEN SHOULD EVER BE FOUND GUILTY OF A CRIME WHEN 
THERE WAS NO CRIME, NO INTENT, NO COMPLAINT SIGNED BY AN 
INJURED PARTY AND THERE WAS NO ONE THAT COULD BE 
REIMBURSED FOR THEIR LOSS. 
8. THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
GUARANTEED RIGHT OF CONFRONTING HIS ACCUSER WHEN THE COURTS BELOW 
REFUSED TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO INTRODUCE IMPEACHING EVIDENCE OF 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, FALSE SWEARING, PERJURY AND PREJUDICE 
ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSER AND ONLY WITNESS. 
a. On the back of the citation (Utah Highway Patrol No. B 143695), Sgt. 
Owen Busch made several malicious, inconsistent, false and 
misleading statements. (See EXHIBIT "A".) 
He estimated the traffic volume as being "moderate" even 
though the vehicles in the two southbound lanes averaged at least 
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one-quarter mile apart. He indicated that the Defendant was 
"belligerent". The statement was false, prejudicial, immaterial and 
irrelevant to the charge. It was his way of getting back at the 
Defendant for a very heated cross-examination of him in the 
Farmington Precinct Court a few weeks before where the officer either 
avoided answering or lied to keep the facts from getting before the 
court on the previous citation. (See EXHIBIT "B".) When a public 
servant stops and harasses the sovereign, places him under arrest 
for asking questions and drags him from his car, who is the 
"belligerent" one? 
Sgt. Busch said that the Defendant was traveling at 65 mph 
south of the Triangle Station. This is challenged by the Defendant. 
The Defendant had set his "cruise" control at 62 mph and his speed 
had not varied for the last four miles. South of Hill Field Road, the 
officer had pulled up along side the Defendant in the right lane and 
about 15 feet back in the so called "blind spot" so that he could 
identify the Defendant without being recognized. The Defendant 
noticed the little white sports car jockeying beside him but didn't pay 
enough attention to it to recognize it was a UHP Mustang. 
Sgt. Busch said that the Defendant had refused to show him 
his I.D. or license, the Defendant did not refuse to identify himself at 
any time. The officer knew exactly who the Defendant was without 
question. 
The Defendant asked the officer for the "probable cause" for 
the stop and also if he was in custody. The Defendant was 
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astonished that Busch would be so aggressive as to stop him or 
arrest him falsely, when the first case was being appealed to the 
Circuit Court. He knew something that the Defendant didn't know: 
That the lower courts would accept an officer's testimony over that 
of a citizen, whether it is inconsistent or not. The inconsistencies in 
the officer's testimony was ruled as "not before the court". The 
Citizens are guilty until they prove themselves innocent, and the 
courts will not "put up with" any "sheep" who claim to be Citizens. 
And "that's the way it is." (Quoting a prosecutor.) 
The officer outright lied on the back of the citation when he 
wrote "I had problems the last time I cited this man." The officer that 
disobeyed the subpoena would have verified that that statement was 
untrue. 
When an officer lies, the citizen must not only prove that he 
lied, that it was not merely an opinion or exaggeration, but also he 
intentionally did so with intent and malice. Otherwise the officer's 
testimony will stand and that testimony is sufficient to convict the 
Citizen of anything. 
Sgt. Busch is the supervisor of the UHP Trooper who did not 
show. (See EXHIBIT "C".) I believe they knew the prosecutor and 
court would not place any charges against them. The police, 
prosecutor and court work together and each must be a team player. 
Only Citizens would be held in contempt for not obeying a subpoena. 
The charge that: "He was trying to get me to arrest him" is totally 
false. However, the Defendant did ask if he was in "custody." 
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The UDOT traffic engineer estimated, since he did not have the 
computer print-out for traffic speeds and traffic volumes with him, that 
if there were three times the traffic volume ordinarily using the road 
on Saturday afternoon; the cars would be over 900 feet apart. This 
is in agreement with the Defendant. The sergeant in the UHP with 22 
years of traffic service estimated that the traffic was "moderate". 
The officer said he followed the Defendant over five miles from 
the bottom of Weber Canyon. Why would he do that? Was it to 
provide a friendly service or protect the Defendant from highway 
hazards? No. He followed the Defendant, after verifying it was the 
man he wanted, to harass him. When he walked up to the 
Defendant's vehicle, he said: "I am going to teach you a lesson." He 
didn't say what the lesson was, but the Defendant found out later. 
In the lower courts his word has 10 times more creditability than that 
of any Citizen. 
Busch admitted to following the Defendant at a distance of 250 to 300 
feet for safety reasons, he said. Actually he was 400 to 500 feet 
behind. He also said that he clocked the Defendant for 10 seconds 
to make certain the Defendant was traveling at 65 mph. He claimed 
to be able to clock the speed within one mile per hour. The one mile 
per hour difference, means 1.47 feet per second X10 seconds equals 
14.7 feet. Any man, who claims he can follow another moving vehicle 
250 feet back for 10 seconds and know that the vehicles are the exact 
same distance apart on a highway where there are no stationary 
points of reference; is telling a falsehood. 
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d. In the first case, the public record shows that he testified that he 
could be in "moderately heavy" traffic conditions (actually in the midst 
of a log-jam of 50 vehicles), be in the middle lane of the three-lane 
Interstate on a very dark night and adjust his speed, clock a car 300 
feet ahead in the inside lane, shoot RADAR to verify his speed; at in 
1.5 seconds. The prosecutor and Judge believed him. 
The reason the first case was mentioned is that the Defendant 
asked Sgt. Busch why it took 10 seconds to clock the Defendant: 
"Didn't you testify in a previous court that you could do it in 1-1/2 to 
2 seconds." Busch's answer, "No, I did not, nor would I ever." The 
court's don't seem to care if the statements the officers make are 
reasonable or not, just as long as they get the conviction. (See 
EXHIBIT "D") as submitted to the Circuit Court, Layton Department. 
9. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE ARRESTING 
OFFICER WROTE IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS ON 
THE COMPLAINT AND BECAUSE THE COURT BELOW RECEIVED THOSE 
PREJUDICIAL, IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT STATEMENTS INTO EVIDENCE. 
a. On the citation described in Issue #8, the officer made eight false, 
written statements out of 12 possible. Two statements, (1) there was 
"moderate" traffic and (2) "I had problems the last time I cited this 
man" are easily proven to be false. In his own testimony he admitted 
that the Defendant had not given him any problems, but that he had 
given the Defendant problems. 
Where the animosity came out was in cross-examination during 
the Farmington Precinct Court trial. An attorney said it was the worst 
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courtroom scene he had witnessed in 30 years as a trial attorney. 
The written remark was typical of the officer's verbal remarks in 
attempting to discredit the Defendant. (See EXHIBIT "B" and Issue 
#11.) 
b. The officer used bully and intimidation tactics when giving his citations 
and is a master at denying the court the facts in the courtroom. 
Since he is the training officer for the newer patrol persons, he is 
training them to "get convictions". 
c. If the Appellant understands the legal English used in some of the 
Utah State Code, Sgt. Busch is not only not a creditable witness, but 
has violated most of the statutes in the Abuse of Office of the Utah 
Criminal Code including but not limited to: 
U.C.A. 76-8-201 Official Misconduct 
U.C.A. 76-8-502 False or Inconsistent Material Statements 
U.C.A. 76-8-503 False or Inconsistent Statements 
U.C.A. 76-8-504 Written False Statement 
U.C.A. 76-8-505 Perjury of False Swearing 
U.C.A. 76-8-511 Falsification or Alteration of a Government Record 
U.C.A. 76-8-601 Wrongful Commencement of Action in Justice Court 
U.C.A. 76-8-602 Assuming Liability for Conferring Jurisdiction Upon 
Justice 
and Rule 37, Rules of Civil Procedure on Discovery and Testimony 
10. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HIS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO 
CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS ACCUSER, WHEN THE COURT BELOW 
DENIED DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT OF DISCOVERY OF THE OFFICER'S NOTES MADE 
AT THE SCENE OF THE ARREST, MADE AT THE MOMENT OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
CITATION BY THE ARRESTING OFFICER WHILE "IN THE LINE OF DUTY" AND WHILE 
ON DUTY. 
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a. In the Precinct Court, the police used notes that he claimed were 
taken at the scene and at the time he arrested the Defendant. 
In his "Request for Discovery" Item 5, the Defendant demanded 
"Notes and records (copies will be sufficient) made by patrolman, 
Badge No. 65 pertaining to the accused and/or the citation"; the 
notes were very important to the defense because the officer gave 
testimony inconsistent with the facts of the case. 
In the Circuit Court, when the officer pulled out his notes, the 
Defendant demanded to know why the notes had not been provided 
to him. As you can guess, the court ruled that the notes were his 
"personal notes" and were not subject to "Discovery" by the 
Defendant. 
11. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND HIS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTTO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS 
ACCUSER WHEN, REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN PROPRIA PERSONA, THE COURT 
BELOW WOULD NOT SUSTAIN HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE INAPPROPRIATE, 
UNRESPONSIVE AND FLIPPANT ANSWERS ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSING 
OFFICER AND THE COURT WAS GENERALLY INTOLERANT AND UNRESPONSIVE TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR HELP IN ASCERTAINING THE TRUTH FROM THE 
STATE'S PRINCIPLE AND ONLY WITNESS. 
a. In the Farmington Precinct Court the Defendant was found guilty of 
the crime of speeding and in addition, was found guilty of Contempt 
of Court for expecting answers to his questions. In the trial de novo, 
the Defendant tried in every way to show the court and the prosecutor 
that the police officer was not reliable as a witness. That he had 
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made false, written statements and perjured himself. His avoidance 
of the questions in cross-examination and malicious remarks in place 
of them, caused the Defendant to be found in Contempt of Court. 
The court flatly stated that the question of whether he was a reliable 
witness was not before the court. 
The following partial transcript of the Contempt of Court trial 
is an example of the typical answers given by Sgt. Busch and the 
reaction of the Judges. 
BAKER: "Do you recall specifically two or three questions: 'How 
many cars did we pass while you were following me in 
the last leg of your clocking me? How many cars 
passed us? How many cars did we pass?'" 
BUSCH: "Do I recall what the answer was, or what?" 
BAKER: "Do you recall me asking those questions?" 
BUSCH: "Yes, I do." 
BAKER: "Do you recall how many times I asked those 
questions?" 
BUSCH: "Several times over and over." 
BAKER: "Did I ask the Judge (Judge Stewart) to order you to 
answer those questions?" 
*BUSCH: "You asked the Judge a lot of things. You were arguing 
with the Judge all the time." 
BAKER: "I think you are out of order there. I don't know...." 
(Looking to the court for help.) 
JUDGE 
BEAN: "Well, the answer is broader than the question." 
BAKER: "I think he ought to limit his answers to the specific..." 
JUDGE 
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BEAN: (Interrupting Baker) "Sgt. Busch was.... Did the Judge 
(Stewart) ask you to answer a question? ...if you can 
go ahead and answer that." 
BUSCH: "I don't recall specifically on which question the Judge 
asked me to answer." 
JUDGE 
BEAN: "All right, please go ahead, Mr. Baker." 
BAKER: "Did the Judge ever ask you, or order you to answer 
a question?" 
BUSCH: "I don't recall specifically whether he did or not." 
BAKER: "You recall he didn't then? Is that correct? Did he tell 
me to ask the questions again? Do you recall that 
statement?" 
BUSCH: "Yes, he did." 
BAKER: "Was that probably because I didn't get the answers I 
*BUSCH: (Interrupting Baker) "No, it was because you ask 
confusing questions, and he wanted you to clarify your 
questions and make them clear to me." 
BAKER: "Are you being argumentive at this particular time?" 
The questions that were asked several times before Baker asked 
Judge Stewart to order Busch to answer were: "In the last mile or so 
before you stopped me, how many cars did we pass? How many 
cars passed us? Which lane was I in? Which lane were you in?" 
Admittedly those are tough questions for a UHP Sgt. to 
understand with only 22 years on the force. Baker requested Judge 
Stewart to order Busch to answer the questions. The Judge asked 
Baker to ask his questions again. Baker did and Busch did again find 
the questions confusing and he continued to let the court know what 
a trouble-maker Baker was instead of answering the questions. The 
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(*) remarks are typical of Busch's answers to Baker's questions. As 
Judge Bean pointed out, Busch's answers were "broader than the 
question." This was typical of Judge Stewart's attitude also. Baker 
thought he had a right to the answers to those specific questions in 
the Precinct Court and that is why Judge Stewart found Baker in 
Contempt of Court. When Baker didn't make his answers clear 
enough, the Prosecutor and Judge went for his juggler. 
12. THE DEFENDANT, ACTING IN PROPRIA PERSONA, DENIED DUE 
PROCESS AND HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN 
THE PRECINCT COURT, WHEN HE WAS FOUND GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 
FOR MAKING THE DEMAND THAT THE OFFICER ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS. (SEE 
EXHIBIT "H".) 
a When the officer avoided answering the Defendant's questions in 
cross-examination, the Defendant requested the Judge to order the 
officer to answer the question. The officer never failed to answer, but 
seldom did the answer pertain to the questions when they were of a 
critical nature. The Defendant made similar requests for help from 
Judge Stewart three different times during the trial. On this particular 
series of questions the Defendant asked the same questions over and 
over but failed to receive any legitimate answers. When the Defendant 
started over for about the 5th time, the prosecutor jumped up and 
said that "The questions had been answered." The Defendant asked 
him for the answers so he could continue his questioning. Judge 
Stewart asked the Defendant to "settle down," then he added that he 
thought the questions had been answered. The Defendant then 
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demanded to know the answers. If everyone else knew the officer's 
answers, doesn't the Defendant have the right to know them also. 
The questions were attempting to establish a foundation for other 
questions. He was on trial. Judge Stewart slammed down his gavel 
in front of God, the jury, the prosecutor, and incredible witness saying 
to the Defendant: "You are in Contempt of Court." The Judge then 
asked the jury to leave the courtroom. He then said that the 
Defendant was "In Contempt of Court" and that the Defendant was 
fined $50.00. 
THE JURY FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY AS CHARGED, 
b. The Contempt of Court charge was appealed to the Layton Circuit 
Court along with the speeding charge. 
U.C.A. 78-32-1 Acts and Omissions Constituting Contempt 
list the acts constituting Contempt of Court. The Defendant is hard 
pressed to identify which of the acts he committed. It is quite easy, 
however, to assign one or more contemptuous acts to some 
witnesses, the complainant, prosecutor and judge. How is it 
disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge to 
cross-examine and demand answers from the only witness? 
There was no "breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or 
violent disturbance" by the Defendant. He didn't misbehave in office 
or deceive anyone. He didn't disobey any lawful judgement, order 
or process of the court. In fact he tried to use the court process to 
put the facts before the judge and jury. He'll probably never know. 
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c. It would seem very strange to an outside observer that in the Circuit 
Court trial on Contempt of Court, the prosecution only brought in 
Judge Stewart as the witness for the prosecution. The Appellant 
subpoenaed Sgt. Busch, three of the four jurors (the Justice Court 
didn't have a list of the jurors, only the potential jurors), and Don 
Bybee, a witness to the previous trial. (Mr. Bybee's attached letter 
will indicate the general attitude of the police officer and the judge in 
the first case which didn't change in this case.) The Defendant's 
interest was getting the facts before the court. Facts don't seem to 
mean much anymore. Falsehoods by our public servants seem to 
have far greater weight on the scales of justice. 
15. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HIS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTTO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS 
ACCUSER WHERE TWO OF THE THREE MATERIAL WITNESSES, WHO ARE ALL 
EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE, FAILED TO OBEY LAWFUL SUBPOENAS TO APPEAR AT 
THE TRIAL AND THE OTHER WITNESS, WHO DID APPEAR, FAILED TO BRING 
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED IN "SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM" WHICH WERE MATERIAL 
TO THE DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE, AND WHEN REQUESTED, THE COURT BELOW 
REFUSED TO COMPEL THEIR APPEARANCE, HOLD THEM IN CONTEMPT, OR 
POSTPONE THE TRIAL (SEE EXHIBIT "C".) 
a. Trooper Lloyd Michaud, Badge #384 of the Utah Highway Patrol was 
served with a subpoena by the Davis County Sheriff. He works under 
the direct supervision of Sgt. Busch and was with Busch the first time 
Busch cited the Defendant. Michaud made no contact before or after 
the trial. He failed to obey the subpoena. 
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Mr. Robert Todd, P.E. is the Standards Engineer for UDOT Highway 
Design Department. Todd was notified about 10 days in advance, 
but he wanted the Defendant to pay him $50.00 per hour consulting 
fee to testify. After Todd was served the subpoena about three or 
four days before the trial, he told the Defendant that Mr. Lee Ford of 
the Utah Attorney General's office told him that he was not required 
to obey the subpoena because he had not received the witness and 
travel fees. The witness and travel fees were delivered the day before 
the trial, but he refused to accept them. He was required to bring a 
Standard Highway Typical Section which he uses almost daily. Todd's 
only hang-up was how much money he would get for a consulting fee 
and witness fees were unacceptable. 
EXHIBIT "F" is the Defendant's letter to Mr. Paul Warner of 
the Utah Attorney General's office concerning Mr. Ford's erroneous 
advice. EXHIBIT "G" is Mr. Warner's letter to the Defendant 
"whitewashing" Ford's actions. U.C.A. 21-5-15 (1953 as amended) 
states that public servants do not need to be paid witness fees. Why 
doesn't the Attorney General know that? Should the Attorney General 
be advising the other public servants to ignore subpoenas? Can any 
individual legally disobey a legally served subpoena he has received 
by refusing to accept the witness fees? 
Mr. Blair Marsden, P.E. is a traffic engineer at UDOT in charge of 
traffic studies. He was subpoenaed and paid witness fees. He tried 
to get out of going because he wanted much higher fees. The data 
requested in his "subpoena duces tecum" was available to him by 
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computer printout in a very few minutes. The Defendant had picked 
up the same data from Marsden's computer operator a month before 
in much less than 30 minutes and the Defendant didn't know what to 
ask for or what it should look like. Marsden knew exactly what was 
requested two weeks before the trial, even though he was served 
only three or four days before. He needed the traffic volume and the 
speed study at the specific location on U.S. 89. EXHIBIT "E" is the 
speed study. If you read Warner's letter, talked to Todd and Marsden, 
and checked out the required time it takes Marsden's computer 
operator to print out the data, you can see that there is a "whole lot 
of lying going on". Knowing our public servants, we should be used 
to that. 
d. EXHIBIT "F" is the complaint to the Layton Circuit Court explaining the 
problems with the three witnesses and requesting that the court order 
them to show cause why they should not be held in Contempt of 
Court. Action by the prosecutor and courts against public servants 
doesn't happen very often. But then, "That's the way it is." 
14. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO PAY WITNESS FEES TO A 
WITNESS WHO IS A STATE EMPLOYEE AND CALLED DURING BUSINESS HOURS 
WHICH REQUIREMENT TO SO PAY WAS REQUESTED BY THE PROSECUTOR AND 
ORDERED BY THE JUDGE IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO U.C.A. 21-5-15 (1953 AS 
AMENDED). 
a. Sgt. Owen Busch was called to testify as a witness for the defense 
in the Contempt of Court trial because he was a witness to the fact. 
He is a State employee. He requested the prosecutor, who requested 
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the Judge to order the Defendant to pay for all his time spent at the 
trial. He submitted his time to the court for reimbursement. The court 
and prosecutor seemed very happy about adding that burden to the 
Defendant's list of "Got Ya's." 
15. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO PAY FEES TO 
WITNESSES IN A CRIMINAL CONTEMPT TRIAL, WHEN THOSE CALLED WERE 
WITNESSES TO THE FACT, AND U.C.A. 21-5-14 (1953 AS AMENDED) IS IN VIOLATION 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
AND OF THE UNITED STATES. 
a. The Defendant has committed no crime. He has not damaged, 
injured, threatened, harmed or in any way trespassed upon another. 
He has merely attempted to defend himself in the only way he knows 
how against great odds for a trial to be fair, the presence of the 
witnesses to the facts is crucial. This whole process is warped and 
the only persons who can alleviate the people's burden, are greedy 
and/or protecting their bottoms. Maybe the Defendant is a slave and 
just doesn't know it. 
b. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says that the Accused 
in all criminal prosecutions shall enjoy the right to the compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. If the Accused can't pay 
their fees, does that mean he can't have witnesses. Art. I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution says much the same thing. Where does it 
say that the government may harass and hassle a citizen for three 
years, forcing him to defend himself at his own expense from the 
accusations of a known false swearer who is salaried and his legal 
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costs to harass the Defendant are supported by our government. 
Someone said that if the people who make the rules, or carry them 
out, were in the prisons and the prisoners were out; we would be 
living with a better class of people. 
a The court furnished to Defendant the subpoenas that were served on 
the witnesses of the fact, without any indication to the Defendant that 
he would be responsible for their fees. 
d U.C.A. 21-5-14 (1953 as amended) pertains to the creatures, but not 
the citizens who have rights and immunities against harassment by 
their government and a right to a fair trial. 
e. The Davis County Attorney wrote the Layton Circuit Court requesting 
that Mr. Baker be held responsible for the witness and mileage fees 
as they applied to witnesses that he subpoenaed and that an order 
be entered directing Mr. Baker to pay those fees and expenses. The 
trial was on the 13th day of May, 1988, the letter is dated June 14, 
1988, but the letter was not mailed until several weeks later. This 
document was not timely, but the good Judge Bean decided to handle 
the matter as a matter of "housekeeping" against the objections of 
timeliness of the Defendant. (See EXHIBIT "I".) 
16. WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE COURT 
BELOW DENIED HIS REQUEST FOR "RIGHTS SUA SPONTE"? 
a. Since the Defendant was acting in Propria Persona, and since he is 
not trained in the law, he filed a Notice of Demand with the court to 
honor, protect and preserve all rights of the Accused. 
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The court is required to notify the Accused of any violation of 
rights under the Common Law whether enumerated in the State or 
U.S. Constitutions; Federal, State or County Statutes; or by any Rules 
of Procedure "sua sponte". 
That the notification take place prior to the Accused losing 
such rights, or violation thereof, in order to protect the Accused's 
right from any source. 
b. The judge refused to allow the Defendant to "voir dire" the jury to 
determine if they were impartial, prejudiced or a jury of his peers. 
c. The judge pushed the trial on without the benefit of witnesses for the 
defense. 
d. The court used no influence to require the arresting officer answer the 
specific questions asked of him. 
e. The Defendant was denied a jury trial on the Contempt of Court 
charge. The court and the prosecutor insisted that it was a civil 
matter when the government attacks a Citizen. The Defendant had 
to prove that it was a criminal matter not civil. 
f. The Defendant was denied a friend to come and sit by him during 
the trial. He could have helped to calm the Defendant, listed 
questions to be brought out later and even helped cross-examine the 
witness. 
17. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY AN "IMPARTIAL JURY OF HIS PEERS," CONCERNING HIS 
RIGHT TO "VOIR DIRE" HIS JURY, WHEN THE COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE 
RIGHT TO PERSONALLY ASK THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS QUESTIONS NECESSARY 
48 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WERE INDEED IMPARTIAL OR WHETHER THEY 
WERE, IN FACT, PREJUDICED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT; IF THEY WERE IN FACT, 
PREJUDICED, OR BECAME SO BY STATEMENTS BY THE COURT; AND IF SUCH 
JURORS COULD BE DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE A "JURY OF HIS PEERS." 
a The Defendant was not allowed to ask any questions of the 
prospective jurors. The Defendant had to ask the Judge the question, 
the Judge often revised or changed it and even sometimes refused 
to ask it of the prospective jurors. 
18. THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HIS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT BY HAVING TO PAY FOR THE TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPTS WHICH HE COULD NOT DO THUS DETRIMENTALLY AFFECTING HIS 
RIGHT TO APPEAL 
a. The Defendant was in every sense impecunious with insufficient 
money to pay for the transcripts. The Defendant has not found any 
regular employment during the last three years. 
b. Art. I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution states: "In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgement, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed." 
The Defendant's inability to pay for the trial transcripts 
eliminates over 98% of the cases that would ordinarily be appealed. 
When 98% of the appealable cases are discharged due the costs of 
the transcripts, does that sound like justice is being served? It sounds 
much like the injustices perpetrated on the people by the I.R.S. 
c. Since the case is being appealed, the Circuit Court decision is no 
longer the final judgement. The final judgement is when the case is 
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settled and not in the status of appeal. Our courts are using the cost 
of the transcripts to deny justice to those people who have a 
legitimate complaint and appeal. 
19. THE DEFENDANT, THROUGH CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND HIS CONTROL 
HAS INSUFFICIENT INCOME TO SUPPORT HIMSELF; CANNOT FIND STEADY WORK 
WITHIN THE STATE; IS SUPPLIED FOOD AND LODGING BY ANOTHER, AND COULD 
NOT POSSIBLY SAVE OR BORROW THE FUNDS TO PAY FOR THE REQUIRED TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPTS; THE DEFENDANT MUST BE DEEMED IMPECUNIOUS, WHERE THAT 
DETERMINATION WAS BASED SOLELY ON THE MERE FACT THAT HE LIVES IN A 
HOUSE AND HAS ACCESS TO A MOTOR VEHICLE. THE HOMELESS AND BEGGARS 
ARE NOT THE ONLY INDIVIDUALS THAT CAN BE DEEMED IMPECUNIOUS PURSUANT 
TO U.C.A. 21-7-3 (1953 AS AMENDED). 
a. The prosecution provided no evidence supporting their position that 
the Defendant was not in impecunious, except that he lived in a house 
and had access to a motor vehicle. 
Impecuniosity is defined as being without money. It doesn't 
mean that he has to be homeless or hungry. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DON L. BYBEE Being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes 
that he has no interest in the case of L. D. BAKER and that he has personal 
knowledge of the facts asserted herein and they are true to the best of his 
knowledge, infonnation and belief: 
1. I was present in the Courtroom of John Stewart in Farmington 
Utah on or about December of 1987 when L.D. Baker was representing himself 
on a speeding ticket, 
2. It was my observation that the Utah Highway Patrol seargeant 
Oven Bush was conducting the prosecution and making the rulings for the 
court on what he would and would not answer on cross examination. He argued 
with Mr. Baker and avoided answering direct and clear questions. Each 
answer he gave was either a question or an argument. The Judge refused to 
order an answer to the questions and in many of the exchanges did not get 
involved at all. 
3. It was ray observation that Mr. Baker was locked in the flow 
of traffic and the officer was attempting to claim he "bulled" his way thru 
the car which was ahead without that car moving out of the way, or Mr. Baker 
changing lanes. The officer claimed to have obtained a radar reading on the 
car going the same direction in the middle of a group of cars and refused to 
answer how he managed to do that. This in an area now signed for 65 mph. 
I told Mr Baker that this was the worst example of injustice or scene I had 
seen in 30 years of practice. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 19th day of September, 1989. 
JY^  commission expires: 
L.D. BAKER 
345 West 1600 South 
SLC, UT 84115 
Judge K. Roger Bean 
Layton Circuit Court 
437 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, UT 84041 
Re: State vs• L.D. Baker, Case No. 87-200-5384 
Dear Judge Bean: 
On the 13th of May, 1988, a trial was held in the above 
court without jusisdiction. At that time, the ACCUSED had 
subpoenaed several witnesses that apparently refused to appear 
or refused to bring the papers and documents that was subpoenaed. 
These refusals had a great bearing on the results of the case. 
The following persons refused to appear or did not bring 
the documents requested: 
Officer Lloyd Michaud, Badge #384, UHP. 
50 East State St, 
Farmington, UT 84025 
No excuses, just didn't show. He was served by the Davis 
County Sheriff just a few days before. 
Mr. Robert Todd, Standards Engr. UDOT 
4501 S. 2700 W. 
SLC, UT 84119 
Mr. Todd wanted to be paid $50.00 per hour for his time. 
When it was explained that all that could be afforded by the 
ACCUSED was the $14.00 plus travel, he decided not to come. 
He apparently called Mr. Lee Ford, of the Attorneys Generals 
Office, who apparently (according to Todd) tod Todd he didnft 
have to go to the trial. One of the reasons was that the 
witness fee and travel espenses did not accompany the subpoenae. 
The fees were delivered to the secratary of Mr. Todd immediately, 
the secretary promised to deliver it to him as soon as he was 
out of a conference. It is believed that Mr. Todd had seen the 
ACCUSED deliver the fees -and refused to accept them so he 
wouldn!t have to show up. It is the opinion of the ACCUSED 
that the conditions of the service were met by the delivery 
of the fees prior to the time of trial. 
Mr. Blair Marsden, Traffic Engineer, UDOT 
4501 S. 2700 W. 
SLC, UT 84119 
Mr. Marsdenshow up at the trial, but without on tiny 
bit of information that was subpoenaed. The ACCUSED was not 
able to overcome the lack of information. Again Mr. Lee Ford 
of the Attorney General's Office was responsible, according to 
Marsden. According to Mr. Marsden, Ford told him that he could 
not take that information to a trial of a private citizen. 
Ford told Mr. Marsden to attend but he was not allowed to take 
any of the traffic data with him, according to Marsden. 
BAKER 87-200-5384 
This just three more instances where my government is 
attempting to deny the ACCUSED a fair and just trial. The 
evidence would have proved Sgt. Owen Busch!s testimony to 
be false and inconsistant throughout. 
Other than Officer Michaud, the real culprit here is 
Mr. Lee Ford. Marsden and Todd called him to get fflegal 
adviceM. Instead of providing assistance to the public as 
his office requires, he gave them advice on how to thwart 
or frustrate the citizen in his endeavor to seek justice 
and truth in the court. 
believes 
The ACCUSED^that the trial lacked the clear cut proof 
it would have had if the persons and documents subpoenaed 
had been produced. He is hereby requesting the court to call 
these witnesses and Mr. Lee Ford because he acted as counsel 
for Mr. Todd and Mr. Marsden and denied them taking the 
documents subpoenaed; and order them to show cause why they 
should not be found in Contempt of Court. 
If there are any questions, leave word at 485-3771. 
Justice for all, 
L.D^ BAKER
 D 
in Propria Persona 
P.S, 
"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that 
government officials shall be subjucted to the same 
rules of conduct that are commands to the Citizens. 
In a government of laws, existeanc of the government 
will be imperiald if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious 
(Miranda v. Arizona, 277 U.S. 438, 485) 
All government employee should have to memorize it. 
J-XhtOWl 
L. D. BAKER 
345 West 1600 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801) 485-9200 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
L. D. BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
Accused. 
Case No. 87 200 5384 
Citation No. B143695 
NOTICE AND DEMAND 
FOR DISMISSAL 
NO RELIABLE WITNESS 
COMES NOW the Accused, In Propria Persona, appearing 
specially and not generally herein, to move the court to dismiss 
the charges as there is no evidence that can be brought before 
the court to prove the allegation nor is there a reliable witness 
that any unlawful act was committed. 
EVIDENCE 
There can be no conviction when the state has failed to 
establish the prima facia case just as: 
"It is also a well-recognized rule that the fact 
that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by 
the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the 
prisoner, and that there must be some evidence or 
corroborating circumstances tending to show that a 
crime has been committed, aside from such confessions 
or statements." State v, Keller, 8 ID 699, 704. 
Therefore there must be some sort of evidence that a 
crime has been committed other than the statements of the 
Accused. 
1 
The confession of an Accused is not sufficient to establish the 
corpus delicti. 
Likewise with the prima facia case* The prima facia 
case cannot be proven simply by the accusation of the plaintiff. 
There must be some evidence of corroborating circumstances to 
prove not only that a crime was committed, but that the Accused 
committed said crime. 
If the prima facia case held on the single testimony of 
an officer, then any charges brought by an officer could not be 
refuted. If this is the state of the law then there can be no 
justice for all charges brought forward by an officer are in and 
of themselves valid and the accused is simply guilty and should 
be punished. This would mean that our government employees are 
in total control of the people and the people have become, in 
essence, slaves to their servants. 
If the testimony of a single government official is 
sufficient to obtain a conviction without any evidence in support 
of that testimony, then there is no need to have a judicial 
system. The government official should simply collect a fine, 
punish, or exterminate the Accused at the scene of any alleged 
crime according to his own judgement. 
If law is reason, it is only reasonable that the 
Plaintiff must have more than one officer testify or one officer 
and some evidence to support the officer's testimony. 
WITNESS 
The only witness that can be brought forward by the 
2 
Plaintiff is one single police officer who is not a reliable 
witness. The United States Supreme Court has rules in Briscoe v. 
La Hue, 460 U. S. , that police officers may commit perjury 
with total impunity. 
In the DECLARATION of INDEPENDENCE, Jefferson listed 
among many other injuries the following: 
"He has erected a multitude of new offices, and 
sent hither swarms of officers to harass the people, 
and eat out their substance.ff 
ARTICLE 38 of the MAGNA CARTA states: 
"No officer, for the future, shall put any man 
to his law, upon his own simple affirmation without 
credible witness produced for that purpose." 
The officer is an interested witness in that his 
personal reputation and future success as a police officer are 
involved. Therefore, to benefit himself it would be in his best 
interest to perjure himself to maintain a high degree of 
credibility among his peers and to make his efficiency appear 
greater in the eyes of his superiors. 
Since it is in the best interest of the officer to 
appear efficient, competent and reliable by his supervisors and 
to make him more accepted by his peers, he needs to obtain a 
conviction. Since there are no civil or criminal consequences to 
him if he does perjure himself he has nothing to loose. 
Therefore, the testimony of the officer cannot be 
reliable and must be discarded by the court. 
WHEREFORE, the Accused moves the court to dismiss the 
charges. 
3 
Oral argument demanded. 
Dated this 18th day of January, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L.D. BAKER 
In Propria Persona 
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L.D. BAKER 
345 W. 1600 S. 
Mr. Paul Warner SLC> U T 8 4 1 1 5 
Utah Attorney Generalfs Office 
Utah State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Dear Sir: 
When I was in your office a week or two ago5 I ask you 
to check with Mr. Lee Ford as to his advice to Engineers in 
UDOT. 
Some charges had been made against me in a traffic situa-
tion, which required the help of a UDOT engineer to verify the 
conditions. According to Mr. Blair Marsden, a professional 
Engineer for UDOT, Mr. Lee told him that the computerized data 
accumulated by UDOT was not available to be used in court at 
least in this instance. The proper evidence was not introduced 
in court and Mr. Marsden gave some opinions that were not 
according to their traffic data. 
As soon as practical I would like an answer to why Mr. Lee 
told Mr. Marsden, he was not to use the UDOT data that was 
available to him as the f,keeper of the files". 
Mr. Ford also advised a Mr. Todd, the Standards Engineer, 
not to submit to the Summons. Is Mr. Ford a servant of the 
public? What is his point in blocking government informa-
tion being used by the citizens, who paid for it in the first 
place. 
Thank your for your time, when I visited wir:h you, and 
for your investigation of the situation. I would sincerely 
appreciate an early response. 
Sincerely. 
L.D. Baker 
£A tfl |'5j 
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Mr. L. D. Baker 
345 West 1600 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Mr. Baker: 
Thank you for your recent letter wherein you inquired 
concerning why Mr. Lee Ford of our office advised engineers in 
UDOT not to make certain information available to you for your 
traffic violation case. I apologize in taking some time in 
replying to you, but I have been out of the office and have only 
recently been able to talk with Mr. Ford concerning the matter. 
According to Mr. Ford, he informs me that he did in 
fact speak with Blair Marsden of UDOT concerning your request for 
information records. Mr. Marsden was concerned about the 
voluminous nature of the records. According to Mr. Ford, as told 
to him by Mr. Marsden, you did not specify with sufficient detail 
the information you wanted him to prepare and generally that no 
advance arrangements were made. Mr. Marsden therefore did not 
know what records to produce and did not have time to research 
and compile them. Mr. Ford further indicates that he advised Mr. 
Marsden to appear and explain that particular problem to the 
court. However, Mr. Ford denies that he advised Mr. Marsden that 
the records could not be made available given proper advance 
arrangements. 
As to Mr. Bob Todd, Mr. Ford recalls that Mr. Todd had 
indeed been subpoenaed. However, again no advance notice or 
arrangements were made. Mr. Todd was very busy at the time, and 
quite frankly did not want to appear. Based on the fact that you 
had not included the standard witness fee or mileage check along 
with the subpoena, the law does not require one to appear unless 
he has been served properly with not only the subpoena but the 
witness and mileage fees as well. Mr. Ford suggested to Mr. Todd 
2 3 6 STATE CAPITOL SALT LAKE CITY, l/TAH 8-11 14 TELEPHONE 8 0 l - 5 a 8 - [ 0 l o 
Mr. L. D. Baker 
June 10, 1988 
Page Two 
that he contact you directly and explain his reason for not 
appearing. Apparently Mr. Todd did not do so. 
Mr. Ford is of the opinion, which I also agree, that it 
would be proper procedure for you to notify these people in 
advance as to what arrangements needed to be made, i.e., when and 
where you wanted them to appear, with what specific records you 
wanted, as well as appropriate witness and mileage fees to pay 
the cost of their appearance. Without proper advance 
preparation, it is very common for witnesses to fail to appear. 
Finally, based upon my discussions with Mr. Ford, I 
find nothing that he did improper. Indeed, I believe that his 
advice to the UDOT employees was in actuality proper and correct. 
While I recognize that in your opinion this may well have 
prejudiced your case, I also believe that if you are determined 
to act as your own counsel, you have the responsibility to 
ascertain the appropriate and proper way to subpoena witnesses. 
Your failure to do so in this particular matter may well have 
hurt your case, but I am sure that Mr. Ford acted properly in 
advising the UDOT employees as he did. It is entirely likely 
that perhaps the information you received from the employees was 
not entirely accurate insofar as what advice Mr. Ford had given 
them. I hope this information has been helpful to you. 
Very truly yours, , 
PAUL M. WARNER 
Associate Deputy Attorney General 
PMW/sh 
L.D. BAKER 
345 W. 1600 S. 
SLC, UT 84115 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH < 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. > 
L.D. BAKER ) 
Defendent/Appellant, '-
J CASE No. 87 200 5384 
) CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE 
) BRIEF AND DOCUMENTATION 
OF FACTS FOR APPEAL 
COMES NOW the Appellant demanding his rights at all 
times and not waiving his rights at any time including 
his right to time. The Appellant feels strongly that the 
following points must be made to correct the file in this 
case. 
POINT #1 
It is important to point out that "if the police officer 
had answered the Accusedfs questions, there never would have 
been any reason for the charge of 'CONTEMPT OF COURT™. In 
fact if the police officer had answered the questions, the 
Accused would have been found innocent of the original charge. 
The Justice of Peace (Judge Stewart) admitted that I had 
requested his help in getting the officer to answer the 
questions that were ask. He didn't recall if he directed 
the officer to answer or not. In truth the Justice gave 
answer 
the Accused no help whatever in making the officer/the ques-
tions that were ask. My question to the court is: Did the 
Accused receive "Due Process", when he is blocked from getting 
the evidence before the court? 
The officer consistantly in the Justice court avoided 
the questions ask and contributed his own biased remarks on 
another subject which was often false, misleading or uncom-
plimentary to me. If the Circuit Court Judge will play back the 
BAKER - Contempt trial 
minutes of the Contempt hearing where the officer was ask 
the question MDo you recall the time in the trial when I 
turned to the Prosecutor and ask him TWhat were the answers 
to my questions3 so I can continue my questioning'Mthe judge will 
find that the officer answered something like "I donft remember, 
but I remembered you arguing with the judge.'" I objected, 
but Judge Bean overruled me saying that all the officer said 
was that he didn't remember. 
When I was cross examined by the prosecutor, he and 
Judge Bean jerked me back abruptly, and made^stick to the 
questions ask. The Judge may not find th£^ answer the officer 
gave was too far out of line, but He will have to admit that 
if every question were answered that way, only w±£h^several 
minutes of diatribe added to each of my questions, none of 
my evidence could have been put before the court, the judge 
and the jury would have been confused as to what my point of 
evidence was and the court would have been in chaos while 
denying me "Due Process". 
POINT #2 
The testimony of an Attorney with over 30 years as a 
'trial Attorney' voluntarily came in to court and testified 
that Judge Stewart's Court was in utter chaos. Donald L. 
Bybee also testified that the police officer avoided my 
questions, gave only the answers he wanted to give, gave 
information that did not pertain to the questions ask, argued 
with me in the cross-examination and Judge Stewart sat idly 
by. Admittedly, Bybee saw my first experience in Judge 
Stewart's Court, but the scene didn't change much in the 
second trial. My questions were much better, and I requested 
help from the Judge more, but the results were the same. 
The evidence; that the officer refused to allow the court to 
hear.was never heard# The Judge refused to order the officer 
to answer the questions that were ask, even though I demanded 
that the Judge do so. My demand that the evidence that the 
officer was concealing, be brought out in court was answered 
by a charge of "Contempt of Court" against me. 
The police have been trained to be 'professional witnesses1 
They appear to be trained to avoid any questions that would 
bring out evidence contrary to their objective, which isnft 
always the facts of the case or the truth. Is the object of 
the Courts to collect the revenue, or is it the hear the facts 
of the case and administer justice? 
POINT #3 
The Prosecutor with full knowledge of what the officer 
was doing, avoiding my questions, contributed to the delin-
quency of the police officer and the court by allowing the 
officer to avoid my questions. My investigation of the ethics 
of the Prosecutor, shows that he must "disclose evidence 
favorable to defendent". The court and the Prosecutor demand 
that I answer the questions put to me honestly and on point. 
Is there a another standard for "police officers", or profess-
ional witnesses. The Prosecutor knew the the officer was 
avoiding my questions and the the Justice Court was in chaos 
during my corss-eximination. 
POINT # 4 
There was testimony from the former jurors, that they had 
been sent out of the Court several times. There was no testi-
mony from anyone, even Judge Stewart, that they were sent out 
of the room several times so the Judge could chastise me. 
The jury was sent from the Courtroom to discuss motions and 
jury instructions in addition to the one time that they were 
sent from the courtroom after Judge Stewart charged me with 
contempt of court. After the jury was sent from the room, 
Judge Stewart said again the he found me in contempt of court 
and fined me $50.00. Only the one time was there any discussion 
of contempt when the jury was out of the courtroom. Does that 
prejudice the jury for the Judge to hit his gavel and say the 
defendent is in Contempt of Court? 
- 3 -
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POINT #5 
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: 
MThe Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behavior, . . .I! 
Was Judge Stewart in ngood behavior11 when he denyed me "Due 
Process"? Or when he refused to order the officer to answer 
my specific questions? Or when he allowed his court to be 
in utter chaos while the defendent was attempting to bring 
the facts before the court? Or when he continually allows 
the only witness to the "crime" avoid questions put to him 
by the defendent? Or when he prejudices the jury by threat-
ening the defendent with the charge of contempt of court, 
when the one and only object of the defendent is to bring 
the facts in the case out in court so they can be judged? 
Or when he slams down the gavel and shouts "You are in 
Contempt" to the defendent, when all the defendent has done 
is demand the answer to his questions to the police officer? 
If the Prosecutor and the court believe that the officer has 
answered the defendentfs questions, does the defendent have 
the right to know the answers? The answers to the questions 
were very simple. 
The questions were: 
How many cars passed us while you were following 
me for the 5 miles? 
How many cars did we pass in that 5 miles? 
What: lane were you in for the last mile or two? 
What: lane was I in the last mile or two? 
All of those questions could have been answered by a 
number, a right or left lane or by a ! I don't remember1 
answer. Even thought those questions were ask at least four 
times, the officer avoided giving any answers. He did his 
diatribe, giving the jury the idea that he had answered the 
questions. Can a citizen be found in Contempt of Court for 
asking for the answers to those questions? I was merely trying 
to prove the the officer had lied when he marked on the citation 
that there was moderate amount of traffic on the road at that 
_ 4 -
time, when he knew that there were no cars on the 4-lane 
divided expressway going our direction within k mile. This 
was only one of the officer's many falsehoods on the citation 
and in the trials. Is it denial of MDue ProcessM if the court 
refuses to provide to the defendent the facts that the court 
has ruled was given by the officer? How can the facts of the 
case be brought out if the court rules that the answers were 
given and yet no one knows what the answers to thequestions 
were? Is the Judge in good behavior if he prevents the facts 
proving a falsehood be denied to the jury? 
The fact remains that if the police officer had answered 
the questions even reasonably, there would not have been any 
contempt of court charge against the defendent. 
Dated this 27 day of May, 1988. 
In propria Persona 
- 5 -
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY 
MELV1N C WILSON 
June 14, 1988 
Judge K. Roger Bean 
Layton Circuit Court 
4 37 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Re: State of Utah vs. Lester Baker 
Dear Judge Bean: 
On the 13th day of May, 1988, a trial was held in the 
above entitled matter in your Court. At that time, the defendant 
Mr. Baker had subpoenaed several witnesses including Trooper Owen 
Bush and the individuals who had served as }ury members in his 
trial in the Precinct Court. At that time, a question arose as to 
who had the responsibility to pay the witness fees and mileage for 
those witnesses subpoenaed by Mr. Baker. 
Utah State Code Annotated 21-5-14 (a copy of which is 
attached) , provides that no defense witness shall be subpoenaed 
at the expense of the State or County unless the Court has so 
ordered. In reviewing the file, I do not show that Mr. Baker 
ever petitioned the Court or requested the Court for such an 
order. 
It is, therefore, my opinion that based on this statute 
and based on Mr. Baker's failure to file the necessary 
affidavits, that Mr. Baker must be held responsible for the 
subpoenaed. In this regard, it would be the request of the State 
of Utah that an order be entered directing Mr. Baker to pay those 
fees and expenses. 
If you have any questions, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
even J. Major 
puty TDavis County Attorney 
ZLK-pi ui i 
ic : L.Baker 
